Search results for "VCG"

Hits ?▲	Authors	Title	Venue	Year	Link	Author keywords
97	Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm	Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges.	AAMAS	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	combinatorial auctions and exchanges, VCG mechanism
94	Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer	Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand.	EC	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	inefficient allocation, payment redistribution, welfare maximization, mechanism design, vickrey-clarke-groves mechanism
88	Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes	On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome.	EC	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	substitutes property, mechanism design, communication complexity, vickrey-clarke-groves mechanism, competitive equilibrium
77	Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Amy Greenwald	Destroy to save.	EC	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	inefficient allocation, payment redistribution, mechanism design, vcg
75	Danny Kuminov, Moshe Tennenholtz	User modeling in position auctions: re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms.	AAMAS (1)	2009	DBLP BibTeX RDF
75	Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer	Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments.	EC	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	payment redistribution, mechanism design, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
75	Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm	Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments.	AMEC	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
71	Ruggiero Cavallo	Optimal decision-making with minimal waste: strategyproof redistribution of VCG payments.	AAMAS	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	mechanism design, social choice, VCG
67	Ning Chen 0005, Arpita Ghosh, Nicolas S. Lambert	Social lending.	EC	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	peer-to-peer lending, social lending, internet auctions
67	Kunal Talwar	The Price of Truth: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms.	STACS	2003	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
67	Peter V. Homeier, David F. Martin	Mechanical Verification of Mutually Recursive Procedures.	CADE	1996	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
67	Peter V. Homeier, David F. Martin	Trustworthy Tools for Trustworthy Programs: A Verified Verification Condition Generator.	TPHOLs	1994	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
57	Luzi Anderegg, Stephan J. Eidenbenz	Ad hoc-VCG: a truthful and cost-efficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish agents.	MobiCom	2003	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	routing, ad hoc networks, energy efficiency, game theory, mechanism design, VCG mechanism, selfish agents
54	Gunes Ercal, Rafit Izhak-Ratzin, Rupak Majumdar, Adam Meyerson	Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks.	SAGT	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
54	Ruggiero Cavallo	Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design.	EC	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	mechanism design, redistribution, social welfare
54	Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo	Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols.	IAT	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
54	Tokuro Matsuo, Takayuki Ito 0001, Robert W. Day, Toramatsu Shintani	A robust combinatorial auction mechanism against shill bidders.	AAMAS	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	pareto efficiency, shill bids, combinatorial auctions, incentive compatibility, computational mechanism design, vickrey-clarke-groves mechanism
54	Ming-Yang Kao, Xiang-Yang Li 0001, Weizhao Wang	Towards truthful mechanisms for binary demand games: a general framework.	EC	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	demand games, mechanism design, pricing, selfish agent
50	Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan	Revenue submodularity.	EC	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	market expansion, efficiency, monotonicity, trade-offs, revenue, submodularity, vcg, optimal auctions
49	Yongwei Wang, Mukesh Singhal	LSTOP: A Light-Weight Scalable Truthful Routing Protocol in MANETs with Selfish Nodes.	ADHOC-NOW	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	the VCG Mechanism, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), Routing Protocol, Truthfulness, Selfish Nodes
49	Debasis Mishra	Simple primal-dual auctions are not possible.	EC	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	gross substitutes, primal-dual auctions, universal competitive equilibrium, VCG mechanism, competitive equilibrium
48	Abraham Flaxman, David Gamarnik, Gregory B. Sorkin	First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Cost in a VCG Auction.	WINE	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
43	Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm	Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments.	EC	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	combinatorial auctions, collusion, vcg mechanism
43	Lifei Hao, Bing Jia, Jingbin Liu, Baoqi Huang, Wuyungerile Li	VCG-QCP: A Reverse Pricing Mechanism Based on VCG and Quality All-pay for Collaborative Crowdsourcing.	WCNC	2020	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
43	Sichao Yang, Bruce E. Hajek	VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG Mechanisms to One-Dimensional Signals.	IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
43	Sichao Yang, Bruce E. Hajek	VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG Mechanisms to One-Dimensional Signals.	CISS	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
43	Rica Gonen	Non-VCG schemes and coalition resistant mechanisms (סכימות שאינן VCG ומכניזמים חסיניי קואליציות.).		2005	RDF
40	Stefan Schneider 0004, Pasha Shabalin, Martin Bichler	Effects of Suboptimal Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions.	AMMA	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	Sunanda Manke, Kavita Khare, S. D. Sapre	100Mbps Ethernet data transmission over SDH networks using Cross Virtual Concatenation.	ICON	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	Fangwen Fu, Mihaela van der Schaar	Noncollaborative Resource Management for Wireless Multimedia Applications Using Mechanism Design.	IEEE Trans. Multim.	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	Piotr Augustyniak	Optimal Coding of Vectorcardiographic Sequences Using Spatial Prediction.	IEEE Trans. Inf. Technol. Biomed.	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan	Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions.	EC	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	combinatorial auctions, incentive compatibility
40	Dirk Neumann 0001, Björn Schnizler, Ilka Weber, Christof Weinhardt	Second-Best Combinatorial Auctions - The Case of the Pricing-Per-Column Mechanism.	HICSS	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	John Matthews, J Strother Moore, Sandip Ray, Daron Vroon 0001	Verification Condition Generation Via Theorem Proving.	LPAR	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	Takayuki Suyama, Makoto Yokoo	Strategy/False-Name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-attribute Procurement Auction: Handling Arbitrary Utility of the Buyer.	WINE	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
40	Weizhao Wang, Xiang-Yang Li 0001, Yu Wang 0003	Truthful multicast routing in selfish wireless networks.	MobiCom	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	wireless ad hoc networks, mechanism design, pricing, selfish
36	David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan	ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange.	EC	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	combinatorial exchange, threshold payments, preference elicitation, VCG
35	Ana Cristina Bicharra Garcia, John C. Kunz, Martin Fischer 0010	Cutting to the chase: improving meeting effectiveness by focusing on the agenda.	CSCW	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	agenda, mechanism design, meetings, VCG mechanism
35	Luzi Anderegg, Stephan J. Eidenbenz, Leon Peeters, Peter Widmayer	Optimal Placement of Ad-Hoc Devices Under a VCG-Style Routing Protocol.	ALGOSENSORS	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
35	Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan	Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms.	STOC	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	combinatorial auctions, incentive compatibility
35	Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe 0001, Tami Tamir	Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms.	FOCS	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
35	Edith Elkind	True costs of cheap labor are hard to measure: edge deletion and VCG payments in graphs.	EC	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	shortest paths, auction, mechanism design
27	Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan	Revenue Submodularity.	AMMA	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Yufeng Wang 0001, Akihiro Nakao	On Novel Economic-Inspired Centrality Measures in Weighted Networks.	APSCC	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Eyal Even-Dar, Jon Feldman, Yishay Mansour, S. Muthukrishnan 0001	Position Auctions with Bidder-Specific Minimum Prices.	WINE	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Xinhui Yuan, Songqiao Chen, Xinhua Jiang	A Low Overhead Truthful Energy-Efficient Routing Protocol in Wireless Mobile Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.	ICYCS	2008	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Aaron Archer, Éva Tardos	Frugal path mechanisms.	ACM Trans. Algorithms	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	Truthful mechanism design, overpayment, game theory, dominant strategies, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
27	John O. Ledyard	Optimal combinatoric auctions with single-minded bidders.	EC	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	auction, mechanism design, core, combinatoric
27	Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz	Mediators in position auctions.	EC	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	auction, mediator, equilibrium
27	Yufeng Wang 0001, Yoshiaki Hori, Kouichi Sakurai	On Characterizing Economic-Based Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms to Solving Hidden Information and Hidden Action in Ad Hoc Network.	UIC	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari	Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach.	COMSWARE	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Jonathan Rabin, Onn Shehory	Theoretically Founded Optimization of Auctioneer's Revenues in Expanding Auctions.	AMEC/TADA	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Jun Shu, Pravin Varaiya	Smart pay access control via incentive alignment.	IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun.	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Claudson F. Bornstein, Eduardo Sany Laber, Marcelo Mas	On Behalf of the Seller and Society: Bicriteria Mechanisms for Unit-Demand Auctions.	LATIN	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes	MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems.	AAMAS	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Makoto Yokoo, Toshihiro Matsutani, Atsushi Iwasaki	False-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol: Groves Mechanism with SubModular Approximation.	AAMAS	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	strategy-proof, combinatorial auction
27	Takayuki Suyama, Makoto Yokoo	Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction.	Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst.	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	strategy/false-name proof, mechanism design, combinatorial auction, multi-attribute
27	Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy	Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming.	FOCS	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	I. S. W. B. Prasetya, A. Azurat, Tanja E. J. Vos, Arthur van Leeuwen	Building Verification Condition Generators by Compositional Extensions.	SEFM	2005	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	modular verification, verification tool, verification technique
27	Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, Kenneth Steiglitz	Frugality in path auctions.	SODA	2004	DBLP BibTeX RDF
27	Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen	On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation: [extended abstract].	EC	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	frugality, mechanism design, task allocation
27	Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen	On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation.	PODC	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	expected payment, frugality, mechanism design, task allocation
27	Ning Chen 0005, Hong Zhu 0004	Fully Truthful Mechanisms.	SOFSEM	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Takayuki Suyama, Makoto Yokoo	Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction.	AAMAS	2004	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan	Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Constraints.	CP	2003	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
27	Aaron Archer, Éva Tardos	Frugal path mechanisms.	SODA	2002	DBLP BibTeX RDF
27	Amir Ronen	Mechanism design with incomplete languages.	EC	2001	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
23	Hamdi Yahyaoui	Trust Assessment for Web Services Collaboration.	ICWS	2010	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	Web Services, Collaboration, Trust, Game, Tasks Allocation, VCG
23	Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta	Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanisms.	EC	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	auction design, efficiency, vcg, optimal auctions
23	Hamdi Yahyaoui	A Reputation-Based Game for Tasks Allocation.	ICEIS	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	Game, Reputation, Tasks Allocation, VCG
22	Zhen Kong, Cheng-Zhong Xu 0001, Minyi Guo	Mechanism Design for Stochastic Virtual Resource Allocation in Non-cooperative Cloud Systems.	IEEE CLOUD	2011	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism design, game theory, resource allocation, Cloud computing, virtual machine, stochastic approximation
22	Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden	Simple versus optimal mechanisms.	EC	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	auctions, revenue-maximization, vcg mechanism, vickrey auction, optimal auctions
22	Prasad Chebolu, Alan M. Frieze, Páll Melsted, Gregory B. Sorkin	Average-Case Analyses of Vickrey Costs.	APPROX-RANDOM	2009	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	VCG auction, Random Assignment Problem, shortest path, minimum spanning tree, random graph, Average-case analysis, MST
22	Robert W. Day, S. Raghavan 0001	Computing core payments in combinatorial auctions.	SIGecom Exch.	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	VCG payments, bidder-Pareto-optimality, core allocations, proxy auctions, combinatorial auctions, constraint generation
22	Zhixing Huang, Shigeo Matsubara	DFCA: A Flexible Refundable Auction for Limited Capacity Suppliers.	GECON	2007	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	Refundable auction, price matching, incentive compatibility, advance reservation, VCG mechanism
22	Mingming Lu, Feng Li 0001, Jie Wu 0001	Incentive Compatible Cost- and Stability-Based Routing in Ad Hoc Networks.	ICPADS (1)	2006	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	incentivecompatibility, routing, Ad hoc networks, stability, payment, VCG mechanism
22	Jun Shu, Pravin Varaiya	Mechanism Design for Networking Research.	Inf. Syst. Frontiers	2003	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	congestion control resource allocation, economical efficiency, QoS, game theory, mechanism design, pricing, MPLS, DiffServ, VCG mechanism
22	Rahul Garg 0001, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, Akshat Verma	Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality.	EC	2003	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF	frugality, agents, game theory, lattice, core, substitutes, VCG mechanism
21	Leijie Wu, Song Guo 0001, Zicong Hong, Yi Liu, Wenchao Xu 0001, Yufeng Zhan	Long-Term Adaptive VCG Auction Mechanism for Sustainable Federated Learning With Periodical Client Shifting.	IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput.	2024	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Milad Hoseinpour, Mohammad Hoseinpour, Mahdi Haghifam, Mahmoud-Reza Haghifam	Privacy-Preserving and Approximately Truthful Local Electricity Markets: A Differentially Private VCG Mechanism.	IEEE Trans. Smart Grid	2024	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Frederick V. Qiu, S. Matthew Weinberg	Settling the Communication Complexity of VCG-based Mechanisms for all Approximation Guarantees.	CoRR	2024	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Syeda Tehreem Haider, Muhammad Umar Khan, Sumair Aziz, Muhammad Faraz, Syed Zohaib Hassan Naqvi, Gabriel Axel Montes	Pattern Analysis Framework for Detection of Cardiac Disorders using VCG Signal Analysis.	ICACS	2024	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Mingyu Guo	Worst-Case VCG Redistribution Mechanism Design Based on the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis.	AAAI	2024	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami	Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems.	Soc. Choice Welf.	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Kirthevasan Kandasamy, Joseph E. Gonzalez, Michael I. Jordan, Ion Stoica	VCG Mechanism Design with Unknown Agent Values under Stochastic Bandit Feedback.	J. Mach. Learn. Res.	2023	DBLP BibTeX RDF
21	Ifiok Anthony Umoren, Muhammad Zeeshan Shakir, Hamed Ahmadi	VCG-Based Auction for Incentivized Energy Trading in Electric Vehicle Enabled Microgrids.	IEEE Access	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Meenali Janveja, Ashwani Kumar Sharma, Abhyuday Bhardwaj, Jan Pidanic, Gaurav Trivedi	An Optimized Low-Power VLSI Architecture for ECG/VCG Data Compression for IoHT Wearable Device Application.	IEEE Trans. Very Large Scale Integr. Syst.	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Peng Xiong, Kunlin Li, Jieshuo Zhang, Cong He, Haiman Du, Jianli Yang, Xiaohua Cao, Zengguang Hou, Xiuling Liu	Localization of Myocardial Infarction From 2D-VCG Tensor With DSC-Net.	IEEE Trans. Instrum. Meas.	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Mingyu Guo	Worst-Case VCG Redistribution Mechanism Design Based on the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis.	CoRR	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Mingyu Xiao 0001, Guixin Lin, Bakh Khoussainov, Yuchao Song	Characterizations of Network Auctions and Generalizations of VCG.	CoRR	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Jonathan Wagner, Reshef Meir	Strategy-proof Budgeting via a VCG-like Mechanism.	CoRR	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Jonathan Wagner, Reshef Meir	Strategy-Proof Budgeting via a VCG-Like Mechanism.	SAGT	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Jennifer Ly, Yutian Chen, Bin Tang	Data-VCG: A Data Preservation Game for Base Station-less Sensor Networks with Performance Guarantee.	IFIP Networking	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Xiaomeng Wang, Jie Li, Xingjun Wang	Multi-feature Fusion Network of ECG and VCG for coronary artery disease detection.	CNIOT	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Ralf Elbert, Felix Roeper	Simulation-Based Analysis of Improvements in Vehicle Routing with Time Windows Using A One-Sided VCG Mechanism for the Reallocation of Unfavorable Time Windows.	WSC	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Oussama Laayati, Hicham El Hadraoui, Mostafa Bouzi, Adila El Maghraoui, Ilyass Mousaid, Ahmed Chebak	A Game Theory Approach (VCG-PSO) for Optimal P2P Energy Trading in Blockchain-Enabled Microgrids.	EUROCON	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Mingyu Xiao 0001, Guixin Lin, Bakh Khoussainov, Yuchao Song	Characterizations of Network Auctions and Generalizations of VCG.	ECAI	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Yutong Song, Krishna Murthy Kattiyan Ramamoorthy, Wei Wang 0015, Kazem Sohraby	A Use-It-Or-Lose-It Economic VCG Auction Approach For NOMA Wireless Relay Networks.	COINS	2023	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash	Principal-agent VCG contracts.	J. Econ. Theory	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF
21	Tao Qian 0004, Chengcheng Shao, Di Shi, Xiuli Wang, Xifan Wang	Automatically Improved VCG Mechanism for Local Energy Markets via Deep Learning.	IEEE Trans. Smart Grid	2022	DBLP DOI BibTeX RDF